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Abstract
Autonomous connected vehicles (ACVs) rely on intra-vehicle sensors such as camera and radar as
well as inter-vehicle communication to operate effectively. This reliance on cyber components exposes
ACVs to cyber and physical attacks in which an adversary can manipulate sensor readings and physically
take control of an ACV. In this paper, a comprehensive framework is proposed to thwart cyber and
physical attacks on ACV networks. First, an optimal safe controller for ACVs is derived to maximize
the street traffic flow while minimizing the risk of accidents by optimizing ACV speed and inter-ACV
spacing. It is proven that the proposed controller is robust to physical attacks which aim at making
ACV systems instable. To improve the cyber-physical security of ACV systems, next, data injection
attack (DIA) detection approaches are proposed to address cyber attacks on sensors and their physical
impact on the ACV system. To comprehensively design the DIA detection approaches, ACV sensors
are characterized in two subsets based on the availability of a-priori information about their data. For
sensors having a prior information, a DIA detection approach is proposed and an optimal threshold
level is derived for the difference between the actual and estimated values of sensors data which enables
ACV to stay robust against cyber attacks. For sensors having no prior information, a novel multi-armed
bandit (MAB) algorithm is proposed to enable ACV to securely control its motion. Collectively, the
proposed DIA detection approaches minimize the vulnerability of ACV sensors against cyber attacks
while maximizing the ACV system’s physical robustness. Simulation results show that the proposed
optimal safe controller outperforms current state of the art controllers by maximizing the robustness of
ACVs to physical attacks. The results also show that the proposed DIA detection approaches, compared
to Kalman filtering, can improve the security of ACV sensors against cyber attacks and ultimately
improve the physical robustness of an ACV system.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Intelligent transportation systems (ITS) will encompass autonomous connected vehicles (ACVs),
roadside smart sensors (RSSs), vehicular communications, and even drones [1]–[4]. To operate
autonomously in future ITS, ACVs must process a large volume of data collected via sensors and
communication links. Maintaining reliability of this data is crucial for road safety and smooth
traffic flow [5]–[8]. However, this reliance on communications and data processing renders ACVs
highly susceptible to cyber-physical attacks. In particular, an attacker can possibly interject the
ACV data processing stage, inject faulty data, and ultimately induce accidents or compromise
the road traffic flow [9]. As demonstrated in a real-world experiment on a Jeep Cherokee in [10],
ACVs are largely vulnerable to cyber attacks that can control their critical systems, including
braking and acceleration. Naturally, by taking control of ACVs, an adversary can not only impact
the compromised ACV, but it can also reduce the flow of other vehicles and cause a non-optimal
ITS operation. This, in turn, motivates a holistic study for joint cyber and physical impacts of
attacks on ACV systems.
Recently, a number of security solutions have been proposed for addressing intra-vehicle
network and vehicular communication cyber security problems [11]–[19]. In [11], the authors
showed that long-range wireless attacks on the current security protocols of ACVs can disrupt
their controller area network (CAN). Furthermore, the work in [12], proposed a data analytics
approach for the intrusion detection problem by applying a hidden Markov model. In [13],
the security vulnerabilities of current vehicular communication architectures are identified. The
work in [14] proposed the use of multi-source filters to secure a vehicular network against
data injection attacks (DIAs). Furthermore, the authors in [15] introduced a new framework
to improve the trustworthiness of beacons by combining two physical measurements (angle
of arrival and Doppler effect) from received wireless signals. In [16], the authors designed a
multi-antenna technique for improving the physical layer security of vehicular millimeter-wave
communications. Moreover, in [17], the authors proposed a collaborative control strategy for
vehicular platooning to address spoofing and denial of service attacks. The work in [18] developed
a deep learning algorithm for authenticating sensor signals. Finally, an overview of current
research on advanced intra-vehicle networks and the smart components of ITS is presented in
[19].
In addition to cyber security in ITSs, physical safety and optimal control of ACVs have been
3studied in [20]–[26]. In [20], the authors identified the key vulnerabilities of a vehicle’s controller
and secured them using intrusion detection algorithms. The work in [21] analyzed the ACVs
as cyber-physical systems and developed an optimal controller for their motion. The authors
in [22] studied the safe operation of ACV networks in presence of an adversary that tries to
estimate the dynamics of ACVs by its own observations. The authors in [23] proposed centralized
and decentralized safe cruise control approaches for ACV platoons. A learning-based approach
is proposed in [24] to control the velocity of ACVs. Furthermore, in [25], the authors have
proposed a robust deep reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm which mitigates cyber attacks on
ACV sensors and maintains the safety of ACV system. In [26], the authors studied the essence
of secure and safe codesign for ACV systems.
However, despite their importance, the architecture and solutions in [11]–[26] do not take into
account the interdependence between the cyber and physical layers of ACVs while designing
their security solutions. Moreover, the prior art in [11]–[26], does not provide solutions that can
enhance the robustness of ACV motion control to malicious attacks. Nevertheless, designing an
optimal and safe ITS requires robustness to attacks on intra-vehicle sensors as well as inter-
vehicle communication. In addition, these existing works do not properly model the attacker’s
action space and goal (physical disruption in ITS) while providing their security solutions. In
this context, the cyber-physical interdependence of the attacker’s actions and goals will help
providing better security solutions. Finally, the existing literature lacks a fundamental analysis
of physical attacks as in the Jeep hijacking scenario [10] in which the attacker aims at disrupting
the ITS operation by causing non-optimality in a compromised ACV’s speed.
The main contribution of this paper is, thus, a comprehensive study of joint cyber-physical
security challenges and solutions in ACV networks which can be summarized as follows:
• To address both safety and optimality of an ACV system, first an optimal safe controller is
proposed so as to maximize the traffic flow and minimize the risk of accidents by optimizing
the speed and spacing of ACVs. To the best of our knowledge, this work will be the first
to analyze the physical attack on a ACV network and to prove that the proposed controller
can maximize the stability and robustness of ACV systems against physical attacks such as
in the Jeep hijacking scenario [10].
• To improve the cyber-physical security study of ACV systems, next, new DIA detection
approaches are proposed to address cyber attacks on ACV sensors and to analyze the
physical impact of DIAs on an ACV system. To efficiently design the DIA detection
4approaches, ACV sensors are characterized in two subsets based on the availability of
a priori information about their readings.
• For the first subset of sensors which have a priori information, a DIA detection approach is
proposed derive an optimal threshold level for sensor errors which enables ACV to detect
DIAs. For the second subset of sensors that lack a priori information, a novel multi-armed
bandit (MAB) algorithm is proposed to learn which sensors are attacked. The proposed
MAB algorithm uses the so-called Mahalanobis distance between the sensor data and an
a-posteriori prediction to calculate a regret value and optimize the ACV’s sensor fusion
process by applying an upper confidence bound (UCB) algorithm. The proposed detection
approaches maximize both the cyber security and physical robustness of ACV systems
against DIAs.
Simulation results show that the proposed optimal safe controller has higher safety, optimality,
and robustness against physical attacks compared to other state-of-the-art approaches. In addition,
our results show that the proposed DIA detection approaches yield an improved performance
compared to Kalman filtering in mitigating the cyber attacks. Therefore, the proposed solutions
improve the stability of ACV networks against DIAs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces our system model while
Section III derives the optimal safe controller. Section IV proves that the proposed optimal safe
controller is robust against physical attacks. Section V proposes approaches to mitigate cyber
attacks on ACV while reducing the risk of accidents. Finally, simulation results are shown in
Section VI and conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. ACV Physical Model
Consider an ACV, f , that follows a leading ACV, l and tries to maintain a spacing from
ACV l as shown in Fig. 1. Maintaining a spacing between ACVs is important to maximize the
traffic flow and minimize the risk of accidents [9]. Let vf be ACV f ’s speed in m/s. Then, ACV
f ’s speed deviation can be written as v˙f (t) =
Ff (t)
mf
, uf (t), where Ff (t) is f ’s engine force
in Newtons (N), mf is f ’s mass in kilograms (kg), and uf (t) is f ’s physical controller input
in N/kg . Moreover, letting vl be l’s speed, the spacing d(t) between f and l can be written
as d˙(t) = vl(t) − vf (t). Note that this model can be easily generalized to multiple ACVs by
repeating the same set of equations for every pair of ACVs to capture any ACV network as
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Fig. 1: Illustration of the considered ACV system model.
shown in Fig. 1. Due to discrete time sensor readings in ACVs, we convert the aforementioned
continuous system model to a discrete one using a linear transformation as follows [27]:
vf (t+ 1) = vf (t) + Tuf (t), d(t+ 1) = d(t) + Tvl(t)− Tvf (t), (1)
where T is the sampling period of the sensors in seconds. The model can be summarized as:
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +Buf (t) + F vl(t), (2)
where
x(t)=
 vf (t)
d(t)
, A=
 1 0−T 1
, B=
 T
0
, F=
 0
T
. (3)
To validate the practicality of the proposed system model, we need to show that uf (t) can control
the speed and spacing of f , i.e., uf can take state vector x(t0) to any desired state x(t1). The
following remark shows that uf can control system (2).
Remark 1. If T > 0, then the system in (2) is controllable. To illustrate the reason, we know
that the system (2) is controllable if the rank of controllability matrix C =
[
B AB
]
is 2
(number of state variables) [27]. Thus, we have:
C=
 T
0
 1 0
−T 1
 .
 T
0
 =
 T T
0 −T 2
. (4)
Therefore, for any T > 0 the columns of C are linearly independent which implies that the rank
of C will be 2.
B. ACV cyber model
In order to navigate, as shown in Fig. 1, ACV f relies on nf , nl, and nd sensors which measure
vf (t), d(t), and vl(t), respectively. For instance, multiple intra-vehicle inertial measurement units
6(IMUs) measure vf (t), multiple cameras, radars, and LiDAR can measure d(t), and roadside
sensors and ACV l measure vl(t) and transmit the measurements to ACV f using vehicle-to-
vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication links. Thus, we model the
sensor readings as follows:
zf (t) = hfvf (t) + ef (t), zl(t) = hlvl(t) + el(t), zd(t) = hdd(t) + ed(t), (5)
where zf (t), zl(t), and zd(t) are sensor vectors with nf , nl, and nd elements which measure
vf (t), vl(t), and d(t), respectively. Also, hf , hl, and hd are vectors with nf , nl, and nd elements
equal to 1. Moreover as assumed in [27] and [28], ef (t), el(t), and ed(t) are noise vectors that
follow a white Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance vectors σ2f =
[
σ2f1 , . . . , σ
2
fnf
]T
,
σ2l =
[
σ2l1 , . . . , σ
2
lnl
]T
, and σ2d =
[
σ2d1 , . . . , σ
2
dnd
]T
. Since the sensor readings in (5) are noisy, we
need to optimally estimate vf (t), vl(t) and d(t) from zf (t), zl(t), and zd(t) by minimizing the
estimation error. To find the optimal estimations vˆf (t), vˆl(t), and dˆ(t) (the estimations of vf (t),
vl(t), and d(t)), we use two types of estimators. A static estimator to estimate the variables at the
initial state, t0, (the time step that f starts following l) and a dynamic estimator to estimate vˆf (t)
and dˆ(t) using the state equations in (1). We use a static estimator at the initial state because
ACV f does not follow the speed of ACV l using (1) before t0 and, hence, a dynamic estimator
cannot be used due to lack of information about the dynamics of f before t0. Moreover, for
vˆl(t), we always use a static estimator since we do not have any information on the dynamics
of vl(t).
For the static estimator, we define a least-square (LS) cost function for each variable as follows:
Jf (vˆf (t)) =
1
2
∞∑
t=0
(zf (t)− hf vˆf (t))T R−1f (zf (t)− hf vˆf (t)) , (6)
Jl(vˆd(t)) =
1
2
∞∑
t=0
(zl(t)− hlvˆl(t))T R−1l (zl(t)− hlvˆl(t)) , (7)
Jd(dˆ(t)) =
1
2
∞∑
t=0
(
zd(t)− hddˆ(t)
)T
R−1d
(
zd(t)− hf dˆ(t)
)
, (8)
where Rf ,Rl, and Rd are the measurement covariance matrices associated with sensors measure
vf (t), vl(t), and d(t), respectively. Moreover, since the sensors independently measuring the
three variables, they will not have any noise covariance and Rf ,Rl, and Rd will be diagonal.
Therefore, explicit solution for the optimal estimation can be derived as:
vˆf (t)=
(
hTf R
−1
f hf
)−1
hTf R
−1
f zf (t) =
nf∑
i=1
1
σ2
fi∑nf
i=1
1
σ2
fi︸ ︷︷ ︸
wfi
zfi (t) = vf (t) +
nf∑
i=1
wfiefi (t), (9)
7vˆl(t)=
(
hTl R
−1
l hl
)−1
hTl R
−1
l zl(t) =
nl∑
i=1
1
σ2
li∑nl
i=1
1
σ2
li︸ ︷︷ ︸
wli
zli (t) = vl(t) +
nl∑
i=1
wlieli (t), (10)
dˆ(t)=
(
hTdR
−1
d hd
)−1
hTdR
−1
f zd(t) =
nd∑
i=1
1
σ2
di∑nd
i=1
1
σ2
di︸ ︷︷ ︸
wdi
zdi (t) = d(t) +
nd∑
i=1
wdiedi (t). (11)
For the dynamic estimator, we use a Kalman filter which uses the state equation in the estimation
process. To this end, we define an output equation as follows:
z(t) =Hx(t)+e(t), s.t. H =
 hf 0nf×1
0nd×1 hd
 , z(t) =
 zf (t)
zd(t)
 , e(t) =
 ef (t)
ed(t)
 . (12)
Note that we cannot apply the dynamic estimator on vˆl(t) since we do not have a-priori
information about the dynamics of l. To dynamically estimate dˆ(t) and vˆf (t), we use an a priori
estimation derived from the state equations as well as a weighted residual of output error to
correct the a priori estimation as follows [29]:
xˆ(t)︸︷︷︸
estimation
= xˆ(−)(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
a priori estimation
+K(t)
residual︷ ︸︸ ︷[
z(t)−Hxˆ(−)(t)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
correction
, (13)
where K(t) is the Kalman gain. By defining an a posteriori error covariance matrix P (t) =
E
[
r(t)rT (t)
]
, where r(t) = x(t) − xˆ(t), we can find a K(t) to minimize trace [P (t)] =
E
[
rT (t)r(t)
]
. The solution for such K(t) can be given by [29]:
xˆ(−)(t) = Axˆ(t− 1) +Buf (t− 1) + F vˆl(t− 1), (14)
P (−)(t) , AP (t− 1)AT , (15)
K(t) = P (−)(t)HT
[
HP (−)(t)HT +R
]−1
, (16)
xˆ(t) = [I −K(t)H] xˆ(−)(t) +K(t)z(t), (17)
P (t) = [I −K(t)H]P (−)(t). (18)
where R=
 Rf 0nf×nd
0nd×nf Rd
is a block diagonal matrix. As can be seen from (15), (16), and
(18), the update processes for P (t) and K(t) are independent of the states and controller. Thus,
P (t) and K(t) will converge to constant matrices, P˜ and K˜.
For the studied system, we now define the cyber-physical security problems for ACV systems
that we will study next. We will address three main problems: 1) What is the optimal safe
ACV controller for the system in (2) that minimizes the risk of accidents while maximizing the
traffic flow on the roads? 2) Is the proposed optimal safe controller for ACV systems robust
8and stable against physical attacks? and 3) How to securely fuse the sensor readings to mitigate
DIAs on ACVs and minimize the impact of such attacks on the control of ACVs? Addressing
these problems is particularly important because the model in (2) identifies the microscopic
characteristics of an ACV network and, thus, to achieve large-scale security and safety in ACV
networks we must secure every ACV against cyber-physical attacks.
Addressing these three problem requires a comprehensive study of the interdependencies
between the cyber and physical characteristics of ACV systems. Such interdependent cyber-
physical study helps to find the vulnerabilities of the ACV systems against both cyber and
physical attacks. Thus, we can derive an optimal controller that minimizes the risk of accidents
and we can design cyber attack detection approaches that not only take into account the cyber
characteristics of the ACV system, but also aims at minimizing the likelihood of collisions in
ACV networks. Unlike the works in [11]–[19], we consider the physical characteristics of ACV
systems while developing DIA detection approaches. Moreover, the combined optimal and safe
ACV controller design has not been studied previously in [20]–[26].
III. OPTIMAL SAFE ACV CONTROLLER
Our first task is thus to derive an optimal safe controller for ACV systems. To analyze ACV
f ’s optimal control input uf (t), we define an optimal safe spacing value as o(vf (t)) ,
v2f (t)
2bfT
,
where bf is ACV f ’s maximum braking deceleration. This value is defined so as to guarantee
that if the leading ACV l stops suddenly, the following ACV f will stop completely before
hitting ACV l as long as f starts braking immediately after observing l’s braking process. This
can be captured by the following energy equivalence condition:
mf
2
(v2f (t)− 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Kinetic Energy
= mfbfd(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Potential Energy
⇒ o(vf (t)) =
v2f (t)
2bf
. (19)
Our goal here is to maintain an optimal safe spacing between ACVs f and l. Thus, we define
a physical regret R(t) as the square of difference between the optimal safe spacing and the
actual spacing. This regret quantifies the safety and optimality of ACV motion by preventing
any collisions and minimizing the spacing between the ACVs and can be written as follows:
R(t) = (o(vf (t+ 1))− d(t+ 1))2 =
(
v2f (t+ 1)
2bf
− d(t+ 1)
)2
=
(
(vf (t) + Tuf (t))
2
2bf
− d(t)− Tvl(t) + Tvf (t)
)2
(20)
9In addition, each ACV only have access to estimation of vf (t), vl(t), and d(t). Thus, ACV f
must design an input uf (t) to minimize an estimation of physical regret which is defined as
follows:
Rˆ(t) =
(
(vˆf (t) + Tuf (t))
2
2bf
− dˆ(t)− T vˆl(t) + T vˆf (t)
)2
. (21)
This problem is challenging to solve because vˆl(t) is an independent parameter and ACV f cannot
be sure about the future values of vˆl(t). To solve this problem, we consider two scenarios: a)
ACV f has no prediction about ACV l’s future speed values (One-step ahead controller) and b)
ACV f has a predictor which can predict ACV l’s future speed value for N time steps (N -step
ahead controller)(such predictors have attracted recent attention in the transportation literature,
e.g., see [30] and [31]). Next, we propose an optimal controller for these two cases.
A. One-step ahead controller
To solve the one-step ahead controller problem, we consider some physical limitations on
the speed and the control input. We prohibit the speed from being greater than the free-flow
speed of a road, v˜. Moreover, due to the physical capabilities of the vehicle and for maintaining
passengers’ comfort, we must have a limitation on the control input and speed deviation. Thus,
the optimization problem of the ACV f can be written as follows:
u∗f (t) = arg min
uf (t)
Rˆ(t) (22)
s.t. uminf ≤ uf (t) ≤ umaxf , (23)
0 ≤ vf (t+ 1) ≤ v˜, (24)
|uf (t)− uf (t− 1)| ≤ ∆u, (25)
where uminf < 0 and u
max
f > 0 are the minimum and maximum allowable control input and ∆u
is the maximum allowable change in the controller to yield a comfortable ride.
Theorem 1. The one-step ahead optimal controller is:
u∗f (t) = min
{
max
{
u1(t),
1
T
(√
2bf
(
dˆ(t) + T vˆl(t)− T vˆf (t)
)
− vˆf (t)
)}
, u1(t)
}
(26)
where u1(t),max
{
−vˆf (t)
T
,uminf ,uf (t− 1)−∆u
}
and u1(t) , min
{
v˜−vˆf (t)
T
, umaxf , uf (t−1)+∆u
}
.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
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Theorem 1 derives the optimal controller for the ACV f when it only optimizes its action for
the next step without considering future actions. In the next subsection, we derive the ACV f ’s
optimal controller when it considers minimizing the regret for N step ahead.
B. N -step ahead controller
To find the N -step ahead controller, first we define a discount factor 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 which specifies
the level of future physical regret for the decision taken at each time step. Thus, by defining
the N -step ahead total discounted physical regret R(t, N) , ∑t+N−1τ=t γτ−tRˆ(τ), the controller
optimization problem can be written as follows:
u∗f (t) = [1, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N−1
]
{
arg min
uNf (t)
R(t, N)
}
, (27)
where the conditions in (23), (24), and (25) hold true. Moreover uNf (t) = [uf (t), . . . , uf (t +
N − 1)]T , N is the number of future steps which is taken into account in finding the optimal
controller, and u∗f (t) is the optimal controller at time step t.
Theorem 2. The solution of N -step ahead controller is equivalent to the one-step ahead con-
troller.
Proof. To solve the problem in (27), we use a so called indirect method. To this end, we start
by defining an augmented physical regret using the following state equation:
R′(t, N) = R(t, N) +
t+N−1∑
τ=t
λT (τ + 1)
Axˆ(τ) +Buf (τ) + F vl(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
g(τ)
−xˆ(τ + 1)

=
t+N−1∑
τ=t
[
γτ−tRˆ(τ) + λT (τ + 1) [g(τ)− xˆ(τ + 1)]
]
, (28)
where λ(τ) = [λ1(τ), λ2(τ)]
T . Then, let Hamiltonian function defined as H(τ) , γτ−tRˆ(τ) +
λT (τ + 1)g(τ). Thus, we can write (28) as follows:
R′(t, N) = λT (t+N)xˆ(t+N)︸ ︷︷ ︸
terminal time
+ H(t)︸︷︷︸
initial time
+
t+N−1∑
τ=t+1
[H(τ)− λT (τ)xˆ(τ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
running time
. (29)
Thus, to find critical points (candidate minima) we must solve ∇R′(t, N) = 0. First, we start
by finding the differential dR′(t, N) and then we identify the derivatives as follows:
dR′(t, N) = λT (t+N)dxˆ(t+N) + (∇xˆ(t)H(t))T dxˆ(t) + t+N−1∑
τ=t+1
(∇x(τ)H(τ)− λ(τ))T dxˆ(τ)
11
+
t+N−1∑
τ=t
(∇u(τ)H(τ))T du(τ) + t+N∑
τ=t+1
(∇λ(τ)H(τ − 1)− xˆ(τ))T dλ(τ). (30)
Thus, to have dR′(t) = 0 each of the terms in brackets must be equal to zero:
λ(t+N) = 0, (31)
∇xˆ(t)H(t) = 0,⇒ xˆ(t) =
[
vˆf (t), dˆ(t)
]T
, (32)
λ(τ) = ∇xˆ(τ)H(τ) = ∇xˆ(τ)γt−τ Rˆ(τ) +∇xˆ(τ)g(τ)λ(t+ 1), ∀τ = t+ 1, . . . , t+N − 1, (33)
0 = ∇u(τ)H(τ) = ∇u(τ)γt−τ Rˆ(τ) +∇u(τ)g(τ)λ(t+ 1), ∀τ = t, . . . , t+N − 1, (34)
∇λ(τ+1)H(τ) = xˆ(τ + 1)⇒ xˆ(τ + 1) = g(τ), ∀τ = t, . . . , t+N − 1. (35)
Now, using (33) we will have:
λ(τ) =
 vˆf (τ)+Tuf (τ)bf + T
−1
 γt−τ ( (vˆf (τ)+Tuf (τ))2
2bf
− dˆ(τ)− T vˆl(τ) + T vˆf (τ)
)
+ATλ(τ + 1).
(36)
Moreover, from (34) we will have:
0 = γt−τ
(
(vˆf (τ) + Tuf (τ))
2
2bf
− dˆ(τ)− T vˆl(τ) + T vˆf (τ)
)
T (vˆf (τ) + Tuf (τ))
bf
+BTλ(τ + 1).
(37)
Since λ(t+N) = 0, then from (37), we derive:
uf (t+N − 1) = 1T
[
±
√
2bf
(
dˆ(t+N−1)+T vˆl(t+N − 1)−T vˆf (t+N − 1)
)
− vˆf (t+N − 1)
]
.
(38)
By substituting uf (t+N−1) in (36), we obtain λ(t+N−1) = 0. This process can continue until
τ = t where we obtain λ(t+1) = 0 and uf (t) = 1T
[
±
√
2bf
(
dˆ(t) + T vˆl(t)− T vˆf (t)
)
− vˆf (t)
]
.
Moreover, considering the constraints (23), (24), and (25), we will end up having the optimal
controller as defined in Theorem 1. Thus, we prove that the N -step ahead optimal controller is
equivalent to 1-step ahead optimal controller. 
From Theorem 2, we can observe that, if the ACV f minimizes its immediate physical regret,
it will also minimize its long-term physical regret. This result shows that the proposed optimal
safe controller does not require any information from future dynamics of ACV l as done in [30]
and [31].
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IV. PHYSICAL ATTACK ON ACV SYSTEMS
As derived in the previous section, the proposed optimal controller is a function of vˆl(t). This
makes ACV f vulnerable against a physical attack on ACV l. Thus, we now analyze whether an
attacker can cause instable dynamics at ACV f by controlling l. Consider an adversary who takes
the control of ACV l and tries to cause instability in ACV f ’s speed, vf (t), and spacing d(t).
Using our derived optimal controller, by ensuring uf (t) is not saturated (u1(t) ≤ uf (t) ≤ u1(t)),
and considering the estimated values to be close to the real values we will have:
vf (t+ 1) =
√
2bf (d(t) + Tvl(t)− Tvf (t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
g1(x(t),vl(t))
,
d(t+ 1) = d(t) + Tvl(t)− Tvf (t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
g2(x(t),vl(t))
.

⇒ x(t+ 1) = g(x(t), vl(t)), (39)
where g = [g1(x(t), vl(t)), g2(x(t), vl(t))]
T . (39) is designed such that ACV f will always
maintain an optimal safe spacing with l. However, from (39) we can see that the behavior of
the system is a function of vl. Thus, next, we will analyze the physical attack scenario that is
analogous to the Jeep hijacking case in [10].
A. Stability Analysis
To analyze the stability of (39), first, we define some useful concepts.
Definition 1. [28] x¯(vl) is said to be an equilibrium point for the system in (39) and a constant
input vl, if g(x¯(vl), vl) = x¯(vl).
An equilibrium indicates a point at which the states will not change. From Definition 1 we
can derive the equilibrium point for (39) by considering a constant input vl and solving the
following set of equations:
v¯f (vl) =
√
2bf (d¯(vl) + Tvl − T v¯f (vl), d¯(vl) = d¯(vl) + Tvl − T v¯f (vl), (40)
which results in: x¯(vl) =
[
vl,
vl
2bf
]T
. The derived value for x¯(vl) shows that in order to reach
an equilibrium, ACV f must maintain the optimal safe spacing from ACV l and its speed must
equal to vl. Thus, next, we show that our derived optimal controller is robust, i.e., under our
controller if an adversary hijacks ACV l, it cannot cause instability in vf (t) and d(t).
Definition 2. A system is called asymptotically stable around its equilibrium point if it satisfies
the following two conditions [28]: 1) Given any vl > 0 and ε > 0, ∃δ1 > 0 such that if
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|x(ts)− x¯(vl)|, then |x(t)− x¯(vl)| < , ∀t > ts and 2) ∃δ2 > 0 such that if |x(ts)− x¯(vl)| < δ2,
then x(t)→ x¯(vl) as t→∞.
The first condition requires the state trajectory to be confined to an arbitrarily small “ball”
centered at the equilibrium point and of radius ε, when released from an arbitrary initial condition
in a ball of sufficiently small (but positive) radius δ1. This is called stability in the Lyapunov
sense [28], [32]. It is possible to have Lyapunov stability without having asymptotic stability.
Next, we show how a Lyapunov function can help to analyze the stability of system (39) [28].
From [28], we know that if there exists a Lyapunov function for system (39), then x(t) = x¯(vl) is
a stable equilibrium point in the sense of Lyapunov. In addition, if L(g(x(t), vl))−L(x(t)) < 0
then x(t) = x¯(vl) is an asymptotically stable equilibrium point. We can prove that the system
in (39) is asymptotically stable for the equilibrium point x¯(vl), as follows.
Proposition 1. x(t) = x¯(vl) is a stable equilibrium point in the Lyapunov sense.
Proof. Let L(x(t)) =
(
v2f (t)
2bf
− d(t)
)2
. Then we will have L(x¯(vl)) = 0. Moreover, we can show
that L(x(t)) ≥ 0, ∀x(t). Now, to check if L is a Lyapunov function we have:
L(g(x(t), vl))− L(x(t)) =
(
1
2bf
(√
2bf (d(t) + Tvl − Tvf (t)
)2
− d(t) + Tvl − Tvf (t)
)2
−
(
v2f (t)
2bf
− d(t)
)2
= −
(
v2f (t)
2bf
− d(t)
)2
≤ 0. (41)
Thus, x(t) = x¯(vl) is a stable equilibrium point in the sense of Lyapunov. 
From Proposition 1, we can see that, as long as f follows l using our proposed controller, its
speed and spacing from l will stay stable and will not be affected by the physical attack on l.
This shows that, not only our proposed controller maximizes the safety and optimality in ITS
roads, but also it is robust to physical attacks such as in the Jeep scenario [10].
However, as can be seen from Theorems 1 and 2, even though it is robust to physical attacks,
the derived optimal controller is largely dependent on the estimated values vˆf (t), vˆl(t), and dˆ.
Thus, an adversary can manipulate the sensor data to inject error in the estimation and ultimately
increase the ACV f ’s physical regret. Analyzing such attacks require a cyber-physical study of
the ACV system to derive approaches that mitigate attacks on sensors and minimize the effect of
such attacks on the physical regret. Thus, next, we analyze the cyber attack on the ACV system.
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V. CYBER ATTACK ON ACV SYSTEMS
We now consider a cyber attacker that injects faulty data to sensor readings (cameras, LiDARs,
radars, IMUs, and roadside sensors) such that the attacked sensor vector can be written as: z¯(t) ,
 z¯f (t)
z¯d(t)

z¯l(t)
 ,

zf (t)
zd(t)
zl(t)
+

af (t) , [af1 , . . . , afnf ]
T
ad(t) , [ad1 , . . . , adnd ]
T
al(t) , [al1 , . . . , alnl ]
T
 , (42)
where af (t), ad(t), and al(t) are data injection vectors on sensors and z¯f (t), z¯d(t), and z¯l(t)
are compromised sensor readings from vf (t), d(t), and vl(t), respectively. As we discussed in the
state estimation section, we have a-priory information about sensors which measure vf (t) or d(t),
but such information is lacking for sensors that collect data from vl(t). Thus, next, we consider
cyber attacks on sensors a) with a-priori information and b) without a-priori information.
A. Attack on sensors with a-priori information
As discussed in Subsection II-B, we use Kalman filtering to estimate vˆf (t) and dˆ(t). However,
Kalman filtering is not robust to DIAs [33]. Thus, we propose a filtering mechanism that can limit
the effect of the DIA on vˆf (t) or dˆ(t). To this end, we use the a priori estimation xˆ(−)(t) at each
time step to find an a priori sensor reading z(−)(t) ,Hxˆ(−)(t). Then, the attack detection filter
checks the absolute value of the residual |µ(t)| ,
[
|µf1(t)|, . . . , |µfnf (t)|, |µd1(t)|, . . . , |µdnd (t)|
]T
,∣∣z(t)− z(−)(t)∣∣ < η, where η is the threshold vector. Any sensor which violates this inequality
will be considered as a compromised sensor and will not be involved in Kalman filter update
procedure. To find an optimal value for the threshold η, we next characterize the stochastic
behavior of residual µ(t) when the ACV is not under attack.
Theorem 3. The residual µ(t) follows a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and covariance
matrix as follows:
Cµ = HCrH
T +R−RK˜TQTHT −HQK˜R, (43)
and Cr is the solution of following discrete Ricatti equation Cr = QACrATQT +Cρ, where
Cρ = QFσ
2
l F
TQT +QK˜RK˜
T
QT , and Q =
[
I +
[
I − K˜H
]−1
K˜H
]−1
.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Theorem 3 derives the distribution of µ(t) which we will use next to find an optimal value for
the threshold level η. Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 show a comparison between simulation and analytical
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results derived for the mean and covariance matrix of r(t), ρ(t), and µ(t). From Figs. 2 and 3
we can that the analytical results match the simulation results which validates Theorem 3.
We can now find the probability with which µi(t) (element i of µ(t)) remains below the
threshold value ηi as Pr (|µi| ≤ ηi) = Pr (−ηi ≤ µi ≤ ηi) = Φµi(ηi) − Φµi(−ηi), where Φµi(.)
is the cumulative density function of µi which follows a Gaussian distribution with zero mean
and variance Cµ(i, i) (element in i-th row and i-th column of Cµ). Thus, we can derive the
optimal value for eta by defining Pr (|µi| ≤ ηi) for every sensor. For instance, choosing values
ηi = Cµ(i, i), 2Cµ(i, i), or 3Cµ(i, i) will result in Pr (|µi| ≤ ηi) = 0.68, 0.95, or 0.997. Even by
defining the threshold value, the attacker might stay stealthy in some cases if it controls the
amount of injected data to the sensors. Next, we find a relationship between the maximum value
of DIA and the probability of staying stealthy.
Proposition 2. The probability with which an attack vector a˜ , [af ,ad]T will not trigger the
i-th element of attack detection filter, µi, (stealthy attack) will be given by:
pi(a˜) , Pr (|µi| ≤ ηi|a˜) = Φµi(Ψ ia˜+ ηi)− Φµi(Ψ ia˜− ηi), (44)
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where Ψ i is the i-th row of Ψ =
[
I −H [I −QA]−1QK˜
]
.
Proof. Suppose that the attacker initiates attack after the Kalman filter converges. Thus, from
(14) and (17) we have:
xˆ(t) =
[
I − K˜H
]
xˆ(−)(t) + K˜ z(t)︸︷︷︸
[Hx(t)+e(t)]
+K˜
 af
ad

︸ ︷︷ ︸
a˜
=
[
I − K˜H
] [
Axˆ(t− 1) +Buf (t− 1)
+ F vˆl(t− 1)
]
+ K˜H [xˆ(t) + r(t)] + K˜ [e(t) + a˜] . (45)
Thus, by simplifications analogous to the proof of Theorem 3, we can find r(t) = QAr(t−1)−
QK˜a˜+ρ(t). The expectation of r(t) will be E {r(t)} = QAE {r(t− 1)}−QK˜ E {a˜} . Since
the attack vector is constant, a˜, and E {r(t)} = E {r(t− 1)} for t→∞ we will have the steady
state expected estimation error as E {r(t)} , r¯ = − [I −QA]−1QK˜a˜. Thus, considering such
steady state expected estimation error, r¯, we can derive the mean of µ(t):
E {µ(t)} = E{z(t)− z(−)(t)} = E {Hr(t) + a˜+ e(t)} = [I −H [I −QA]−1QK˜]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψ
a˜.
Since ad is constant, then σµ will not change. Therefore, we can find the probability of not
triggering the attack detection filter for µi as in (44). 
Proposition 2 derives the probability of staying stealthy for any particular DIA vector. Next
we will find how much our defined attack detection filter is robust against a particular DIA. To
this end, first we define a stealthy attack probability vector as p(a˜) =
[
p1(a˜), . . . , pnf+nd(a˜)
]T ,
which is a vector that shows the probability of staying stealthy by initiating a˜ on all of the vf
and d type sensors. The attacker has to find the optimal value of a˜ which maximizes the physical
regret while staying stealthy with probability below a defined value, p, i.e., attack vector must
be chosen such that the physical regret is maximized and every sensor i stays stealthy with the
probability below the i-th element of p.
Corollary 1. The attacker’s optimal attack vector a∗ which maximizes the steady state physical
regret by attacking vf or d type sensors is the solution of following optimization problem:
arg max
a˜
θ˜2 ,
[
r¯TΘr¯ + cT r¯
]2
, (46)
s.t. r¯ = − [I −QA]−1QK˜a˜, (47)
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Θ ,
 12bf 0
0 0
 , c =
 √d˜bf + T
−1
 , (48)
p(a˜) ≥ p, (49)
where d˜ is the average spacing between the ACVs.
Proof. From the definition of physical regret we have:
R(t)
∣∣∣
u∗f (t)
=
((
vf (t) + Tu
∗
f (t)
)2
2bf
− d(t)− Tvl(t) + Tvf (t)
)2
(50)
=

r2f (t)
2bf
+
rf (t)
bf
√
dˆ(t) + T vˆl(t)− T vˆf (t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
'd˜
− rd(t)− Trl(t) + Trf (t)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
θ(t)

2
,
Moreover, the steady state value of θ(t) can be derived by using the steady state expected value
of r¯ as θ¯ = r¯TΘr¯ + cT r¯. Also, the attacker must choose ad to satisfy (44). Thus, the attacker
must solve the optimization problems in (46). 
Corollary 1 derives a robustness level for our proposed attack detection filter. It allows us to
find the maximum regret which is caused by any stealthy attack vector. This allows us to design
a secure cyber-physical ACV system since we take into account the physical regret of DIAs on
sensors. However, the proposed attack detection filter works for sensors with a-priori information
only. For ACV f ’s other sensors which measure vl(t) we do not have a-priori information. Thus,
we next address this case using MAB.
B. Multi-armed bandit learning for attack detection in sensors without a-priori information
To detect the attack on vl type sensors, we cannot use any a priori estimation for vl(t) as
done for vf and d type sensors because ACV f cannot have any information about evaluation of
vl(t) since it does not know how ACV l is being controlled. Such lack of a priori information
makes the attack detection challenging. To overcome this challenge, we propose to use a MAB
learning approach because such approach does not require a-priori information and finds the
optimal action (detecting attacked sensors) only by interacting with the sensors and ACV’s
dynamics. Before applying the MAB algorithm, we define an a posteriori estimation for vl(t):
v
(+)
l (t) =
dˆ(t+ 1)− dˆ(t)
T
+ vˆf (t). (51)
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Here, we also define an a posteriori residual as
∣∣∣µ(+)l (t)∣∣∣,[|µ(+)l1 (t)|, . . . , |µ(+)lnl (t)|]T,∣∣∣hlv(+)l (t)−
zl(t)
∣∣∣. Next, we analyze the distribution of µ(+)l (t) to use it to design an attack detection filter.
Theorem 4. µ(+)l (t) follows a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and covariance matrix Cµl:
Cµl = ΥRlΥ
T + hlJ
[
HACrA
THT −RK˜TQTATHT −HAQK˜R+R
]
JThTl , (52)
where Υ =
[− s1
T
hlw
T
l − I
]
and J =
[
0 1
]
K˜.
Proof. See Appendix C. 
Theorem 4 derives the covariance matrix for µ(+)l (t) which we will use to detect anomaly in
the vl(t) type sensors. To this end, first, we define the squared Mahalanobis (SM) distance, a
measure which quantifies the distance between the a posteriori residual of sensors in a subset L
of vl type sensors, µ
(+)
l (t,L), and the distribution of a posteriori residuals which is derived in
Theorem 4. SM will help us find how much every subset L deviates from its distribution.
Definition 3. The squared Mahalanobis distance between subset L’s a posteriori residual at time
t and its distribution is defined as DL(t) = µ
(+)
l
T
(t,L)C−1µl (L)µ
(+)
l (t,L), where DL(t) is the
subset L’s SM and Cµl(L) is the covariance matrix associated with L.
Next, we derive the expected value and variance of DL(t). We know from [34, (378)] that
E {DL(t)} = E
{
µ
(+)
l
T
(t,L)C−1µl (L)µ
(+)
l (t,L)
}
= Tr
(
C−1µl (L)Cµl(L)
)
= Tr (I) = |L|, where
|L| is the number of sensors in L. In addition, for a subset L of vl type sensors and an attack
vector al(t), we will have:
E {DL(t)} = E
{
µ
(+)
l
T
(t,L)C−1µl (L)µ
(+)
l (t,L) + aTl (t)C−1µl al(t)
}
(53)
= |L|+ E{aTl (t,L)C−1µl (L)al(t,L)} ,
where al(t,L) consists of only elements of al(t) which are in L. Since Cµ(L) is positive semi
definite then C−1µ (L) is also positive semi definite. Thus, we will have E
{
aTl (t,L)C−1µl (L)al(t,
L)
}
≥ 0. Therefore, if there exists a subset L such that E {DL(t)} ≥ |L|, then there is at least
one sensor under attack in L. Hence, at each time step, to estimate vˆl(t), ACV f must choose
a subset L which has the least divergence from |L|. To capture the security level of a subset,
we define a security divergence (SD) metric for a subset L as ςL(t) , E{DL(t)}|L| ≥ 1. Therefore,
a subset L with a lower ςL(t) value has a higher security level.
Moreover, any subset L of vl type sensors have a cost based on the estimation error induced
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to vˆl(t). Thus, we define the cost of L, as νL = E
{
(vl(t)− vˆl(t,L))2
}
, where vˆl(t,L) is the
estimation of vl using the subset L. Thus, to find νL we have:
E{(vl(t)−vˆl(t,L))2}=E{(∑i∈L wlieli)2}=E


∑
i∈L 1σ2
li
eli∑
i∈L 1σ2
li

2=
∑
i∈L 1σ4
li
E
{
e
l2
i
}
∑
i∈L 1σ2
li
2 =
∑
i∈L 1σ2
li∑
i∈L 1σ2
li
2=
1∑
i∈L 1σ2
li
.
Therefore, we have νL = 1∑
i∈L
1
σ2
li
. Clearly, a subset L with a higher ∑i∈L 1σ2li has a lower cost.
While DL represents a security measure for a subset L, νL can be considered as an estimation
performance metric. Thus, at each time step, ACV f must choose a subset L which has the
minimum SD as well as the minimum cost. Thus, we have to find the secure high performance
subset L∗(t) which is a subset that is secure and has the lowest estimation cost. To this end, a
minimization problem that finds the secure high performance subset can be defined as L∗(t) =
arg minL ξL(t), where, ξL(t) = νLςL(t). Although νL is known for f , ςL(t) might change due
to an attack on vl type sensors. Thus, we propose an MAB learning algorithm which learns
the secure high performance subset L∗(t) [35], [36]. Our goal here is to choose a safe subset
of sensors out of all available sensors by efficiently exploring different subsets and effectively
exploiting the optimal subset, thus, we can apply an MAB framework to solve our problem.
In an MAB problem, a decision maker (ACV f ), pulls an arm from a set of available arms
(selects a subset L from vl type sensors). Each arm generates a cost after being played, based
on a distribution that is not known to the decision maker. The aim of ACV f is to minimize a
cumulative cyber regret. This regret is defined as the difference between the reward of the best
possible arm at each step, and the generated reward of the arm that is played [35]–[37].
Let ξ∗(t) = ξL∗(t)(t) be the lowest cost that could be achieved at time t from vl type sensors.
Thus, the cyber regret from t = t0 up to a time t = te is defined as:
Rc(t0, te) , E
[
te∑
t=t0
ξL(t)−
te∑
t=t0
ξ∗(t)
]
, (54)
where the expectation is taken over the random choices of the L. Cyber regret implies choosing
non-optimal and non-secure subset of sensors. Thus, having a high cyber regret implies choosing
a subset of sensors with higher error and possibly higher injected data which can lead to an
estimation error for vˆl(t). Since our proposed optimal controller which minimizes the physical
regret is a function of estimated value, vˆl(t), thus, higher cyber regret results in a higher
estimation error and can introduce physical regret to ACV f . This clearly shows the cyber-
physical aspects of ACV security.
One of the most recognized methods for the MAB problem is to use the concept of UCB
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[35]. In this method, the MAB algorithm at each time t chooses L such that:
I(t) = arg max
L
−νL
|L|
1
nL
nL∑
i=1
DL(tL,i) +
√
2 ln t
nL
(55)
where nL is the number of times that arm L was played before and tL,i is the time step when
L is selected for i-th time. Also, note that nL →∞, 1nL
∑nL
i=1DL(tL,i)→ E {DL(t)} [35], [36].
The UCB algorithm has an expected cumulative regret of:
E {Rc(t0, te)} = 8
∑
L|ξL<ξ∗
ln(te − t0 + 1)
E [ξL]− E [ξ∗] +
(
1 +
pi2
3
) ∑
L|ξL<ξ∗
E [ξL]− E [ξ∗] . (56)
We use UCB algorithm because it has a logarithmic cyber regret and has been shown that there
exists no algorithm that can have a better cyber regret [36]. Thus, using the UCB algorithm and
the defined cyber regret we can address the DIA detection problem for sensors which lack a
priori information.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
For our simulations, we assume that ACV l has a sinusoidal speed pattern and ACV f ’s
initial speed and spacing from the ACV l are vf (0) = 90 km/h and d(0) = 100 m. We set
nf = nd = nl = 4, T = 0.1 s, bf = 2.5 m/s2, and umaxf = −uminf = 0.25 N/kg, which are chosen
based on practical ACV characteristics [13].
A. Optimal Safe Controller
Fig. 4a shows an ACV which uses the proposed optimal controller. From Fig. 4a, we make
three observations: 1) The physical regret converges to zero and the actual spacing converges
to the optimal safe spacing after approximately 20 seconds which shows that the proposed
controller works properly, 2) The speed of ACV f , vf (t), exhibits, approximately, a 5 seconds
delay compared to the ACV l’s speed vehicle vl(t). This is because ACV f should first observe
ACV l and then control its own speed, and 3) The estimated states match with the actual state
values which shows that applied state estimation estimation processes have an error close to
zero.
Fig. 4b shows a comparison between our proposed controller with Gipps [38] and the intelli-
gent driver model (IDM) [39] controllers, two of the well-known controllers for ACV leading-
following scenarios. From Fig. 4b, we can observe three key points: 1) Our proposed controller
can follow the speed of ACV l better compared to IDM as we can see that IDM converges
to an almost constant speed while our proposed controller can track vl(t), 2) The proposed
controller converges to the optimal safe spacing. However, the IDM model has a positive offset
from the optimal safe spacing and the Gipps controller always has a smaller spacing than the
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Fig. 4: The proposed optimal controller’s effect on the physical regret.
optimal safe spacing. This shows that the Gipps model does not take into consideration the
safety as we can see from Fig. 4b that the spacing can admit small values close to 0 meters
which increases the risk of collision. On the other hand, the IDM model does not consider the
optimality of traffic flow as it always yields a higher spacing than the optimal spacing, and 3)
The cumulative physical regret for our proposed optimal safe controller outperforms the other
two models thus demonstrating that the proposed controller can jointly yield optimality and
safety in ACV systems.
B. Robustness Against Physical Attacks
Next, we simulate an attacker which takes control of ACV l and after 100 seconds suddenly
drops the speed of ACV l from 75 km/h to 5 km/h. Fig. 5 shows the effect of this attack on the
ACV f ’s speed, spacing and physical regret. Fig. 5 shows that our proposed controller always
maintains the optimal safe spacing even in presence of an attack. In contrast, the Gipps and IDM
controllers always have an offset from the optimal safe spacing. Hence, our proposed controller
is more robust against physical attacks. Note that, although Gipps can track the speed faster than
our proposed method, however, it does not optimize the spacing. In addition, we can see from
Fig. 5 that the proposed controller has a physical regret closed to zero while the cumulative
regret of IDM and Gipps grow linearly since they have a constant offset from the optimal safe
spacing in this attack scenario.
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Fig. 5: A comparison of the proposed controller, Gipps, and IDM when ACV system is
physical attacked.
C. Cyber Security of ACV Systems
To illustrate the effectiveness of our proposed attack detection approaches, in Fig. 6, we analyze
the impact of DIA on physical regret and estimation errors. Fig. 6a shows the relationship between
the stealthy attack probability and maximum DIA when we apply our proposed attack detection
filter on the sensors with a priori information. Fig 6a shows that as the stealthy attack probability
increases the domain of the attack reduces. Moreover the DIA has higher value for the sensors
with higher noise variance. To stay stealthy with higher probability, the attacker must reduce
the domain of its injected faulty data to the sensors. In addition, Figs. 6b, 6c, and 6d show how
the physical regret and steady state errors are affected by the probability of staying stealthy.
From these figures, we can see that as the stealthy attack probability increases the regret and the
absolute value of steady state errors decrease because the attacker’s maximum DIA decreases.
Fig. 7 shows the estimation error after applying our proposed attack detection filter on sensors
with apriori estimation. From Fig. 7, we can see that, while the attack on vf (t) type sensor does
not affect significantly the estimation, an attack on a d(t) type sensor can cause an estimation
error on dˆ(t). In addition, Fig. 7 shows that the designed attack detection mechanism for sensors
with a priori information mitigates DIAs and keeps the estimation error close to zero.
Fig. 8 shows how the increase on the number of under attack vl type sensors affects the cyber
regret. In this simulation, we use the same settings as for Fig. 4. From Fig. 8, we can first
observe that irrespective of the number of under attack sensors, the attack can be detected in
under 4 seconds as the cyber regret goes to zero after 4 second which is acceptable for this
scenario as in 4 seconds ACV f travels for 80 meters while the optimal safe spacing is also 80
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Fig. 6: Attack detection filter applied on the cyber attacks on vˆf (t) and dˆ(t).
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Fig. 7: Attack detection filter applied on the cyber attacks on vˆf (t) and dˆ(t).
meters, thus, there will be no collision even if ACV l stops suddenly , while ACV f ’s sensors are
attacked. Moreover, the growth rate of cyber regret for the three attacks is approximately equal
regardless of the number of attacked sensors. Furthermore, Fig. 8 shows that, as the number of
attacked sensors increases, the cumulative cyber regret increases faster thus the attack can be
detected earlier. This shows that having access to more sensors is not essentially beneficial for
the attacker and thus, the attacker must also optimize its set of attacked sensors to stay stealthy
for a longer time.
Fig. 9 shows how the domain of attack can affect the cyber regret. We can see from Fig.
9 that, as the domain of injected data to the vl type sensor increases, the MAB algorithm can
chooses the optimal subset more efficiently. This means that injecting higher values to the sensor
increases the chance of detectability and thus, reduces the impact of the attack on the sensors. In
addition, we can see that the cumulative cyber regret for the highest DIA (2.5 m/s data injection)
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Fig. 9: The best subset selection in MAB algorithm applied to vl type sensors.
is greater than other cases, at the beginning of the simulation. However, after almost 350 seconds,
the cumulative cyber regret of the highest DIA becomes the least compared to the other DIAs.
This is due to the fact that a larger DIA leads to a higher cyber regret at the beginning of the
attack which leads the MAB algorithm to detect it earlier than other DIA cases.
Fig. 10 shows a scenario in which the attacker attacks only the third sensor when nl = 4.
Note that, b4b3b2b1 shows the state of the sensors such that for i = 1, . . . , 4 if bi = 1 then
sensor i is under attack and otherwise, it is not. Obviously, when the attacker attacks the third
sensor, the ACV must only rely on the other sensors. The b4b3b2b1 on the x-axis indicates the
chosen subset by the MAB algorithm to use for estimation. Fig. 10 shows that using the MAB
algorithm, percentage of the times that subset {1011} is chosen by MAB is higher than other
cases, which means that the MAB algorithm can detect the attack on the vl type sensors.
Finally, to show that our proposed DIA detection approaches can reduce the physical regret
significantly, in Fig. 11, we consider that the attacker attacks only one sensor of each type
with the lowest noise error variance (most valuable sensor) after 1000 seconds (after ensuring
that Kalman filter converged). Then, we compare the cumulative physical regret of the ACV
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Fig. 11: Comparison of the proposed DIA detection approaches with Kalman filtering.
system for a case in which the ACV only uses a Kalman filter for estimation and another case
in which the ACV applies both of our proposed DIA detection filters. Moreover, in this attack,
we consider that the attacker increases the sensor readings by a factor of 50%. As can be seen
from Fig. 11, the proposed attack detection filter has lower physical regret compared to a simple
Kalman filtering. We can see that while the physical regret increases linearly for Kalman filter,
our proposed DIA detection approach keeps the physical regret close to zero. This shows that,
our proposed DIA detection approach can successfully detect the attack, mitigate it, and keep
the ACV system safe and secure, however the Kalman filter fails to stay robust against the DIA.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have comprehensively studied the cyber-physical security and safety of
ACV systems. We have proposed an optimal safe controller that maximizes the traffic flow
and minimizes the risk of accidents on the roads by optimizing the speed and spacing of
ACVs. In addition, the proposed optimal safe controller maximizes the stability of ACV systems
and improves their robustness against physical attacks. Moreover, we have improved cyber-
physical security of ACV systems by proposing two novel DIA detection approaches. The first
approach detects DIAs using a priori information about the sensors. In the second approach,
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we have proposed an MAB algorithm to learn secure subset of sensors when there exists no a
priori information about sensors. Simulation results have shown that the proposed optimal safe
controller yields better stability and robustness compared to current state of the art controllers.
In addition, the DIA detection approaches improve the security of the sensors and robustness of
the ACV system compared to Kalman filtering.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
First, using (1) and (24) we can find that:
max
{−vf (t)
T
,uminf ,uf (t− 1)−∆u
}
≤ uf (t) ≤ min
{
v˜ − vf (t)
T
, umaxf , uf (t− 1) + ∆u
}
, (57)
and since ACV f only has an estimation of vf (t), then we can rewrite (57) as follows:
max
{−vˆf (t)
T
, uminf , uf (t− 1)−∆u
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
u1(t)
≤ uf (t) ≤ min
{
v˜ − vˆf (t)
T
, umaxf , uf (t− 1) + ∆u
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
u1(t)
. (58)
Now, we can define Lagrangian multipliers and apply the Karush Kuhn Tucker (KKT) conditions
to solve the optimization problem in (22). Then, we will have:
g(uf (t), λ1, λ2) =
(
(vˆf (t) + Tuf (t))
2
2bf
− dˆ(t)− T vˆl(t) + T vˆf (t)
)2
+ λ1(uf (t)− u1(t)
+ λ2(u1(t)− uf (t)), (59)
with the first order necessary conditions given by: ∂g
∂uf
= 0, ∂g
∂λ1
= 0, and ∂g
∂λ2
= 0. When λ1
and λ2 are not active (λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 0), we will have:
∂g
∂uf
=
4T
2bf
(
(vˆf (t) + Tuf (t))
2
2bf
− dˆ(t)− T vˆl(t) + T vˆf (t)
)
(vˆf (t) + Tuf (t)) = 0
⇒ u∗f (t) =
1
T
(
±
√
2bf
(
dˆ(t) + T vˆl(t)− T vˆf (t)
)
− vˆf (t)
)
, − 1
T
vˆf (t). (60)
However, 1
T
(
−
√
2bf
(
dˆ(t) + T vˆl(t)− T vˆf (t)
)
− vˆf (t)
)
and − 1
T
vˆf (t) are not acceptable solu-
tions since they result in vf (t+ 1) ≤ 0. The next step is to show that the third solution in (60)
is the global minimum. Thus, we apply the second-order condition on Rˆ(t) as follows:
d2Rˆ(t)
du2f (t)
=
4T
2bf
[(
T (vˆf (t) + Tuf (t))
2
bf
)
+ T
(
(vˆf (t) + Tuf (t))
2
2bf
− dˆ(t)− T vˆl(t) + T vˆf (t)
)]
d2Rˆ(t)
du2f (t)
∣∣∣∣∣
u∗f (t)
=
4T
2bf
(
T (vˆf (t) + Tu
∗
f (t))
2
bf
)
> 0. (61)
Thus, u∗f (t) =
1
T
(√
2bf
(
dˆ(t) + T vˆl(t)− T vˆf (t)
)
− vˆf (t)
)
is a global maximizer of Rˆ(t).
Now, to consider the constraints in (57), if we activate λ1 or λ2 the first order condition will
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result in having u∗f (t) = u1(t) or u1(t). Therefore, the optimal 1-step ahead controller can be
given by (26).
B. Proof of Theorem 3
We know that the Kalman gain converges to K˜. Thus, from (14) and (17) we can find the
state estimation xˆ(t) as a process which depends on estimation error r(t) as follows:
xˆ(t) =
[
I − K˜H
]
xˆ(−)(t) + K˜ z(t)︸︷︷︸
[Hx(t)+e(t)]
=
[
I − K˜H
]
[Axˆ(t− 1) +Buf (t− 1) + F vˆl(t− 1)]
+ K˜H [xˆ(t) + r(t)] + K˜e(t),
⇒
[
I − K˜H
]
xˆ(t) =
[
I − K˜H
]
[Axˆ(t− 1) +Buf (t− 1) + F vˆl(t− 1)] + K˜ [Hr(t) + e(t)] ,
⇒ xˆ(t) =Axˆ(t− 1)+Buf (t− 1)+F vˆl(t− 1)+
[
I−K˜H
]−1
K˜ [Hr(t)+e(t)]. (62)
Now, by subtracting (62) from the system model defined in (2), we will have:
r(t) = Ar(t− 1) + F rl(t)−
[
I − K˜H
]−1
K˜ [Hr(t) + e(t)] ,
r(t) =
[
I +
[
I − K˜H
]−1
K˜H
]−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q
Ar(t− 1) +
[
I +
[
I − K˜H
]−1
K˜H
]−1[
F rl(t)− K˜e(t)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ρ(t)
Moreover, we can see that ρ(t) is a linear combination of independent white Gaussian process
with zero mean. To find the covariance matrix Cρ of ρ(t) we will have:
Cρ = E
{
ρ(t)ρT (t)
}
= E
{[
QF rl(t)−QK˜e(t)
] [
rTl (t)F
TQT − eT (t)K˜TQT
]}
= E
{
QF rl(t)r
T
l (t)F
TQT −QK˜ e(t)rTl (t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
F TQT −QF rl(t)eT (t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
K˜
T
QT
+QK˜e(t)eT (t)K˜
T
QT
}
= QFσ2l F
TQT +QK˜RK˜
T
QT . (63)
Note that the fact that e(t) and rl(t) are independent leads to having e(t)rTl (t) = 0 . Next, we
write the dynamic model for the estimation error as follows:
r(t) = QAr(t− 1) + ρ(t) = [QA]t−t0 r(tc) +
t−t0−1∑
k=0
[QA]t−t0−k−1 ρ(tc + k), (64)
where t0 is the time step where the Kalman filter converges. Thus, for t  t0 and if QA
is asymptotically stable then we will have r(t) as a Gaussian process due to the central limit
theorem. Now, to find the mean of r(t) we can write:
E {r(t)} = QAE {r(t− 1)}+ E {ρ(t)} = QAE {r(t)} ,⇒ E {r(t)} = 0. (65)
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Next, since the mean is zero, then the covariance matrix of r(t), Cr = E{r(t)rT (t)}. To find
Cr, we have:
E
{
r(t)rT (t)
}
= E
{
[QAr(t− 1) + ρ(t)]
[
r(t− 1)ATQT + ρT (t)
]}
= E
{
QAr(t− 1)rT (t− 1)ATQT +QAr(t− 1)ρT (t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
+ρ(t)rT (t− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
ATQT + ρ(t)ρT (t)
}
.
Note that since r(t− 1) and ρ(t) are independent ρ(t)rT (t− 1) = 0. In addition, we know that
after convergence we will have E
{
r(t)rT (t)
}
= E
{
r(t− 1)rT (t− 1)} = Cr then, we will
need to solve the following discrete Ricatti equation Cr = QACrATQT +Cρ.
Now, the final step is to find the covariance matrix of the residual Cµ. Since after Kalman
filter convergence we will have xˆ(−)(t) = xˆ(t) then:
z(t)− z(−)(t) = Hx(t) + e(t)−Hx(−)(t) = Hx(t) + e(t)−Hxˆ(t) = Hr(t) + e(t). (66)
Thus, we will have:
E
{
µ(t)µT (t)
}
= E
{
[Hr(t) + e(t)]
[
rT (t)HT + eT (t)
]}
= E
{
Hr(t)rT (t)HT + e(t)rT (t)HT +Hr(t)eT (t) + e(t)eT (t)
}
= HCrH
T +R+ E
{
e(t)rT (t)HT +Hr(t)eT (t)
}
. (67)
Now, we have:
E
{
e(t)rT (t)HT
}
= E
e(t)rT (t− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
ATQTHT + e(t)
(
rl(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
FT − eT (t)K˜T
)
QTHT
 = −RK˜TQTHT ,
E
{
Hr(t)eT (t)
}
= E
HQAr(t− 1)eT (t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
+HQ
(
− K˜e(t)+F rl(t)
)
eT (t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
 = −HQK˜R.
Thus, the covariance matrix can be given by (43).
C. Proof of Theorem 4
From (17), after Kalman filter convergence we obtain:
xˆ(t+ 1) =
[
I − K˜H
]
x(−)(t) + K˜ [Hx(t+ 1) + e(t)]
=
[
I − K˜H
]
[Axˆ(t) +Buf (t) + F vˆl(t)] + K˜ [H [Ax(t) +Buf (t) + F vl(t)] + e(t)]
=Axˆ(t) +Buf (t) +
[
I − K˜H
]
F vˆl(t) + K˜HF vl(t) + K˜ [HAr(t) + e(t)] . (68)
Due to the definition ofF =
[
0 T
]T
,
[
I − K˜H
]
F and K˜HF are vectors with two elements
where the first elements are zero. We define two parameters s1 and s2 as
[
I − K˜H
]
F =
 0
s1

and K˜HF =
 0
s2
 , and we will have s1 + s2 = T . Then using (51) and (68) the a posteriori
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estimation will be v(+)l (t) = s1T vˆl(t) +
s2
T vl(t) +
[
0 1
]
K˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
J
[HAr(t) + e(t)] .Thus, we will have:
µ
(+)
l (t) = hlv
(+)
l (t)− hlvl(t)− el(t) = hl
[s1
T
(vˆl(t)− vl(t))
]
− el(t) + hlJ [HAr(t) + e(t)]
= −hl
[
s1
T
nl∑
i=1
wlieli
]
− el(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Υel(t)
+hlJ [HAr(t) + e(t)] . (69)
First, we derive the mean of a posteriori residual:
E
{
µ
(+)
l (t)
}
= −hl
[
s1
T
nl∑
i=1
wli E {eli}
]
− E {el(t)}+ hlJ [HAE {r(t)}+ E {e(t)}] = 0. (70)
Since the mean is zero the covariance matrix of µ(+)l (t), Cµl , can be derived as follows:
Cµl =E
{
µ
(+)
l (t)µ
(+)
l
T
(t)
}
= E
{
[Υel(t) + hlJ [HAr(t) + e(t)]]
× [eTl (t)Υ T + [rT (t)ATHT + eT (t)]JThTl ]
}
=E
{
Υel(t)e
T
l (t)Υ
T + Υ el(t)
[
rT (t)ATHT + eT (t)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
+hlJ [HAr(t) + e(t)] e
T
l (t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
Υ T
+hlJ
[
HAr(t)rT (t)ATHT + e(t)rT (t)ATHT +HAr(t)eT (t) + e(t)eT (t)
]
JThTl
}
=ΥRlΥ
T + hlJ
[
HACrA
THT −RK˜TQTATHT −HAQK˜R+R
]
JThTl . (71)
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